



The cotiventional wisdom once held
thatmoney doesn’t matter. Now there is wide
agreement that monetary policy can signifi-
cantly affect real economic activity in theshort
run, though only the price level in the long
run. Considerable debate remains, however,
about how monetary policy affect.s the real
economy and prices. The Nineteenth Annual
Economic Policy Conference was devoted to
assessing and deepening our understanding
of how monetary policy works. This volume
of the Review contains the proceedings of
that conference. We believe that the careful
and wide-ranging analyses presented here
will focus the debate and perhaps further the
profession’sunderstanding of the monetary
transmission mechanism.
The conference focused on what many
consider to be the two principal channels of
monetary policy: 1) its effect on interest rates;
and 2) its effect on the availabihty of credit.
These channels are sometimes referred to as
the inotrey (or interest rate) channel and the
credit channel, although the conference made
clear the difficulties associated with these
labels. For example, some participants noted
that monetary policy could affeci the real
economy even if it had little or no effect on
real interest rates. Consequently, they objected
to equating the money channel with the
interest rate channel. Furthermore, one form
ofwhat is genericallyreferred to as the credit
channel requires that monetary policyactions
significantly affect the real interest rate. This
form ofthe credit channel differs from the
interest rate channel in the way that changes
in the real interest rate affect output. Conse-
quently, calling one the interest rate channel
and the other the credit channel is potentially
misleading.
THE. LIQUIDITY EFFECT
The first article, by Lee Ohanian and
Alan Stockman, defines the liquidity effect
as “the purported statistical relation between
expansion of bank reserves or a monetary
aggregate and short-run reductions in short-
term interest rates.” Ohanian and Stockman
then explore the liquidity effect in general-
equilibrium, representative-agent models.
Ohanian and Stockman’s analysis shows
that in a general-equilibrium environment,
exogenous changes in money can, in principle,
affect real output, prices or the interest rate.
Ifmoney is neutral and prices adjust instan-
taneously, monetary policy changes the price
level, but not output or the real interest rate.
Ifprices do not adjust instantaneously, a liq-
uidity effect occurs—the real interest rate
declines in response to a monetary expansion.
The failure of the price level to adjust imme-
diately to its new long-run equilibrium, how-
ever, also produces expectations of inflation.
From the Fisher relation, the nominal interest
rate may either rise or fall, depending on the
relative size ofthe liquidity and price expec-
tations effects. Ifthe liquidity effect is domi-
nant, both the nominal and real rates fall. If
the price expectations effect is dominant, the
nominal rate rises.
Ohanian and Stockman show that within
this class of models, variants differ in both
the mechanisms that produce sluggish price
adjustments and in howmonetary policy
actions influence the real economy Their
review considers a wide variety of equilibrium
models: one- and two-sector sticky-price
models, two-country models, limited-partici-
pation models (with and without representa-
tive agents), and even models where the only
role for money is to reduce intermediation
costs. In the last case, the liquidity effect is
perverse: An increase in the money supply
causes the real interest rate to rise because a
monetary innovation represents atechnolog-
ical change. Manyof these models include a
cash-in-advance constraint and all require a
mechanism that causes prices to adjust slowly
to their equilibrium level.
In his discussion of Ohanian and
Stockman’s paper, Kevin Hoover re-interprets
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many of thesemodels within astandard IS-LM
aggregate-supply/aggregate-demand frame-
work. Hoover questions whether the research
agenda on which Ohanian and Stockman
report, namely the modeling of monetary
policy within arepresentative agent, cash-in-
advance constraint framework, is useful for
understanding the liquidity effect. Specifically,
he questions whether the liquidity effect in
such models truly reflectswhat most of the
profession thinks ofas the liquidity effect.
First, he notes that in general-equilibrium
models all of the endogenous variables are
determined simultaneously and, hence, the
interest rate cannot be “causally efficacious,”
as in most discussions of the liquidity effect.
Second, Hoover argues that the liquidity
effect is a feature of financial markets and
that the financial sectors ofthese models are
simply not sufficiently rich to capture the
liquidity effect adequately In models of the
type presented by Ohanian and Stockman,
the interest rate is solely determined by the
shadow prices associated with consumption,
leistrre and saving choices. In the end,
Hoover concludes “that we still are a long
way from understanding the liquidity effect.”
While the theoretical foundations for
the liquidity effect remain controversial, the
article by Adrian Pagan and John Robertson,
and commentary by Lawrence Christiano,
narrow the disagreement about the empirical
relevance ofthe liquidity effect. Pagan and
Robertson thoroughly review the empirical
literature on the liquidity effect, differentiating
between single-equation and systems-modeling
approaches. Arguing for a systems approach,
they focus their attention on the estimation
of vector autoregressions (VARs), which is
the most promising tool for identifying asta-
tistically significant and empirically relevant
liquidity effect.
Pagan and Robertson startwith an inter-
esting discussion of some basic differences
between Sims VARapproach and the older
Cowles Commission methodology, which
involves estimation ofa simultaneous-equation
structural model. The authors point out that
the assumptions used to identify the structural
parameters in VARs, that is, thatthe covariance
matrix is diagonal and that the structure is
recursive are, apriori, no more or less credible
than the identifying restrictions adopted by
the Cowles Commission approach. Since the
Cowles Commission approach frequently
results in over-identified systems, and the
Wold casual ordering exactly identifies the
structural parameters of the system, Pagan
and Robertson state that “One might...cate-
gorize the difference as simply amounting to
whether one wants to work with an exactly
identified system or not.”
Pagan and Robertson also point out
the similarity in the approaches to selecting
among what are essentially observationally
equivalent structures. VARpractitioners
frequently select from alternative Wold
causal orderings by choosing the one whose
impulse response functions are most consis-
tent with their prior beliefs. Researchers in
the Cowles Commission tradition generally
perform dynamic simulations of alternative
models, choosing the one whose dynamic
responses most closely correspond to their
prior beliefs.
Pagan and Robertson go on to confirm
what previous empirical work suggests,
namely, that finding a statistically significant
liquidity effect depends critically on the defi-
nition of money used. A statistically signifi-
cant liquidity effect is generally found only
with nonborrowed reserves or the ratio of
nonhorrowed to total reserves, No statistically
significant liquidity effect is found using total
reserves, the monetary base or Ml.
The authors investigate the robustness
of the estimated liquidity effect to alternative
specifications of the system by including first
commodity prices, and then exchange rates
and foreign interest rates, While these vari-
ables affect the magnitude and persistence
of the liquidity effect, the overall conclusion
remains; that is, a statistically significant
liquidity effect is obtained only when non-
borrowed reserves is used.
Pagan and Robertson also find that the
magnitude of the estimated liquidity effect
depends on the sample period. Specifically,
the liquidity effect essentially vanishes when
the VAR is estimated over the period 1982:12
to 1993:12. Christiano investigates whether
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this marked change is due to the small sample
size or to a fundamental change in thevan-
ance-covariance matrix and concludes: “The
primary reason for the shift in theimpulse
response function appears to lie in a shift in
the variance-covariance matrix ofthe VAR
disturbances.” He notes, however, that the
presence of autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity (ARCH) in the covariance
structure during this period means that this
result could be a statistical artifact, rather than
a true shift in thestructure. Nevertheless, noting
that the Fed’s operating procedure changed in
late 1982, Christiano speculates whether the
observed change in the liquidity effect might
be due to a change in policy regime.
Even ignoring the apparent disappear-
ance of the liquidity effectrecently Pagan
and Robertson find the liquidity effect to
have been arelatively unimportant determi-
nant of the behavior ofthe federal funds rate
in the past. They find that a I percentage point
increase in the level of nonborrowed reserves
reduces thefunds rate by about 13 basis points.
Since the average absolute monthly change in
nonborrowed reserves is about 0.9 percentage
point, the immediate effect of policy actions
on the funds rate seems modest. Moreover,
even when they allow the effect to accumulate
until the impulse response function turns
positive, they find it was rare for the sum to
be smaller than -60 basis points. Hence, they
conclude that “most ofthe factors historically
driving the federal funds rate do not seem to
be due to the Fed....”
aSt ~ tS 4~t:5.~rv r
MOHETAPY POLICY
Articlesby Stephen Cecchetti and
R. Glenn Hubbard survey the credit channel
for monetary policy Although these papers
discuss much of the same literature and evi-
dence, the confluence of their approaches
provides a richer understanding of the issues
than either article alone. Both make clear
that there are two possible credit channels
for monetary policy and that both require
asymmetry in the access of “small” and “large”
firms to credit. The bank credit channel
operates directly on the ability ofdepository
institutions to make loans through the effect
of monetary policy actions (open market
operations) on bank reserves. For example,
restrictive monetary policy actions reduce
reserves and, thereby, loans. Unable to obtain
bank or other external finance, bank depen-
dent firms curtail planned spending.
The second credit channel, which goes
by various names (such as the financial accel-
erator, excess sensitivity or the broad lending
view), works through the effect of a policy-
induced change in interest rates on the balance
sheets of borrowers. For example, by reducing
their real net worth, a policy-induced increase
in the real interest rate makes it difficult for
some, typically smaller, firms to attract capital.
Unable to attract funds, these firms curtail
planned spending. This view differs from the
traditional analysis, wherebyapolicy-induced
increase in interest rates makes marginal
investment opportunities unprofitable.
Both Cecchetti and Hubbard evaluate
the state of the macroeconomic and cross-
sectional evidence on the credit channel.
Cecchetti focuses on the aggregate evidence
and frames his analysis in an interesting
discussion ofthe difficulties associated with
identifying changes in monetary policy, an
analysis of several commonly used indicators
ofpolicy, and adiscussion of how to differen-
tiate alternative views using both aggregate
time-series and cross-sectional data.
Hubbard, on the other hand, focuses
on cross-sectional evidence. He concludes
that there is considerable evidence that “the
spending decisions ofasignificant group of
borrowers are influenced by their balance
sheet condition in the ways described by
financial accelerator models.”
The discussions of these papers by lvi ark
Gertler and Bruce Smith follow very different
lines. Agreeing with essentially all ofwhat
Cecchetti said, Gentler emphasizes the com-
plementanity between the credit and tradi-
tional views of the effect ofpolicy-induced
changes in interest rates on spending. He
illustrates how what he calls the financial
propagation mechanism canmagnify the
traditional effect ofpolicy-induced changes
in interest rates. Gentler’s emphasis on the
propagation mechanism makes clear that this
effect comes into play whatever the source
of the impulse to interest rates. Hence, this
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propagation mechanism may have important
implications for output and interest rates
even if Pagan and Robertson are correct that
the influence of monetary policy on interest
rates is small.
Smith’s analysis, on the other hand,
undercuts the significance of the empirical
research that Hubbard finds most supportive
of the broad credit view. Smith shows that a
general-equilibrium, modified-neoclassical
growth model capturing several key features
of models associated with the broad credit
view of monetary policy, has considerably
different implications. In contrast with most
models generating acredit channel, Smith’s
model has multiple equilibria, with both a
low capital stock, low-income equilibrium,
and a high capitalstock, high-income equi-
librium. In the latter, a low marginal effi-
ciency of capital and high income provide
firms with significant amounts ofinternal
finance. In this equilibrium, an expansionary
monetary policy reduces output, the capital
stock and credit. Hence, in one equilibrium,
credit market imperfections magnify the
effect of monetary policy in a way consistent
with the broad credit view. In the other, the
outcome is inconsistent with the credit view.
lvi oreover, even when monetary policy pro-
duces results consistent with the credit view,
it is not for the reason given by proponents





The last paper of the conference, by
Allan Meltzer, revisits a theme of the first,
namely, that sluggish price adjustment is
necessary for monetary policy to have real
effects. Meltzer*s purpose is to provide
microeconomic foundations for price setting
and the gradual adjustment of prices to new
information.
Meltzer argues that differences in infor-
mation and costs associated with acquiring
information explain three facts about price
setting behavior: 1) that many prices are set;
2) that price setters choose to set nominal
rather than real prices; and 3) that many
prices change slowly over time. While not
rejecting a role for menu prices, imperfect
competition, relative and absolute price
confusion and aggregation in explaining
sticky-price behavior, Meltzer argues that
these alternative explanations are not consis-
tent with one or more features of price data.
Instead, he argues that the cost ofacquiring
information and the inability of individuals
to fully distinguish permanent from transitory
shocks provide bettermicro-foundations for
the sluggish adjustment ofnominal prices
observed in the data.
Meltzer argues that the now widely
adopted approach to providing micro-foun-
dation to macroeconomics, which features
representative agents and complete Arrow-
Debreu markets, havenot, and will not, prove
useful. He contends that this framework
provides no role for monetary disturbances.
1-lence, he concludes that “it is not theappro-
priate micro-foundation for macroeconomics.
No amount of squeezing, cutting and pasting
will make it so.”
In his discussion, Randall Wright
focuses on Meltzer’s remarks about the state
of macroeconomics. Wright defends the use
of general-equilibrium modeling in macro-
economics, arguing that this methodology
has produced great strides in the professions’
understanding of business cycles, labor
markets and economic growth. Moreover,
he argues that the use ofoverlapping-genera-
tions models hasproduced significant contri-
butions to our understanding ofthe properties
of monetary economies and the monetary
policy debate, as well as about economics
generally While conceding that overlap-
ping-generations models have not captured
the medium of exchange function ofmoney
he points out that there are other general-
equilibrium models that explicitly capture
this function ofmoney and the private infor-
mation problem. Finally Wright concedes
that these models “sometimes take the pricing
aspect of the Arrow-Debreu paradigm too
seriously” He notes, however, that the effect
of sticky priceshas been addressed by such
models and states that Meltzer’s article has
not convinced him ofthe value of explaining
endogenously sticky prices.




A paneldiscussion provided a capstone to
the conference. The panelists, Ben Bennanke,
Thomas Cooley and Manfred Neumann, each
took a differentapproach to summarizing the
profession’s understanding of the effects of
monetary policy Bernanke argues that the
semi-structural VARapproachis a fruitful
method for investigating how monetarypolicy
actions are transmitted throughthe economy
He also finds limited-participation models to
be a realistic approach but, sounding atheme
reminiscent ofHoover’s comments, argues that
the cash-in-advance constraint is implausible.
He suggests that a more promising avenue
would be to combine the limited-participation
and sticky-price assumptions.
Bernanke acknowledges recent criticisms
ofthe banklending channel ofmonetary pohcy,
and points to theneed to differentiate between
the bank lending channel and the balance
sheet channel. Heargues that continued work
on the credit channel is desirable because of
quantitative problems with the other leading
models of the transmission mechanism, and
because ongoing institutional changes will
likely affectboth the potency ofpolicy and the
interpretation of monetary’ policy indicators.
Cooley argues that the papers presented
at the conference seem to take as given that
monetary policy can affect the real economy
at cyclical frequencies. He argues that the
theoretical evidencethat the Fed can moderate
cyclical fluctuations in economic activity is
weak and that the empirical evidence for this
proposition is “extremely fragile.” He argues
that the evidence based on VARs or structur-
al VARs is sensitive to the set ofconditioning
variables, the sample period and the identifying
restrictions. Moreover, he asserts that models
that treat money as exogenous are simply
“meaningless.”
Cooley argues that a more interesting and
fruitful approach is to investigate the growth
andwelfare consequences of monetary policy
shifts by modeling artificial economies and
examining them using calibration methods.
He argues that this approach pen’nits explicit
modehng of essential features of thehypothe-
sized transmission mechanism and broadens
the scope ofinquiry from output effects at
business cycle frequencies to growth and
welfare.
Neumann examines the structure of
what he terms the new money-credit view of
monetary policy Comparing this view with
the monetarist view of the transmission
mechanism of monetary pohcy he concludes
that the monetanist approach is the “more
comprehensive.” He points out that the
monetarist approach assumes that all assets,
financial and real, areimperfect substitutes.
Achange in base money sets in motion a
broad process ofportfoho substitution over
a full array ofreal and financial assets, and
overabroad array of financial institutions
and firms. With this as background,
Neumannpoints out how the monetarist
approach of Brunner and Meltzer encom-
passes the traditional IS/LM analysis and the
new money-credit view
Neumann points out that the timing of
the effect of monetarypolicy actions on bank
holdings ofgovernment securities and loans,
documented recently by Bemanke and Blinder
(1992), is a direct implication ofthe monetanist
theory ofrelative prices that Brunner (1970)
had pointed out some time earlier. He also
questions the need to find evidence in support
of the broad credit channel because differences
in financial assets and the existence ofinfor-
mation cost are unassailable.
Finally Neumann points out that the
fact that monetary policy has distributional
effects, impacting more on smaller, financially
weaker firms, is not surprising. This has
no implications for the conduct of monetary
policy, he argues, except to reinforce the
monetaristadvice to avoid large swings in the
creation of reserves or the monetary base.
The conference opened new areas of dis-
cussion and revisited others. Itappears that
the profession is progressing slowly toward a
consensus view of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.
The theoretical foundation for the com-
monly accepted liquidity effect is disputed.
Moreover, the empirical evidence indicates
that the liquidity effect is relatively weak and
short-lived. Ifmonetary policy exerts rela-
tivelymodest influence over the federal funds
rate andif this influence has weakened sig-
nificantly recently for whatever reason, the
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effect of monetary policy through the interest
rate channel or broad credit channel is dubi-
ous. The support for the narrowly focused
bank lending channel is also weak, being
open to considerable criticism and lacking
empirical support. Although the profession
has yet to agree on how monetary policy
impulses are ultimately transmitted to the
price level, we hope that the empirical and
theoretical scrutiny of alternative monetary
transmission mechanisms reported in these
proceedings will stimulate new research
into the channels of monetary policy
Finally a nod to the analysts in the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis who helped to review the
text and data for each of the articles: Jerram
Betts, Kelly Morris, Tom Pollmann, Steve
Stohs, Rich Taylorand Chris Williams.
Daniel L. Thornton and David C. Wheelock
St. Louis, Missouri
May 15, 1995
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